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The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit
Analysis in Design Defect Litigation
Michael D. Green*
A Knight there was, and that a worthy man
That fro the tyme that he first began
To riden out, he loved chivalrie,
Trouthe and honour, fredon and curteisie....
And though that he was worthy, he was wys,
And of his port as meeke as is a mayde.
He never yet no vileynye ne sayde
In al his lyf unto no manner wight.
He was a verray, parfit gentil knyght.
Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales, Prologue 11. 43-46, 68-72.
To employ a well-worn, but nevertheless appropriate cich6, it
is a genuine honor to participate in the Vanderbilt Law Review's
memorial to Dean John Wade. Wade stands tall as a leading figure of
legal academe in the twentieth century.
While I have profited from many illuminating hours with his
scholarship, I regret that my association with him personally was
limited to one lengthy luncheon meeting, still vivid, despite the pas-
sage of many years. I still recall his kindliness and gentility, his dry,
but very real sense of humor, his humility and vigilance in avoiding
taking himself too seriously, his thoughtfulness and deliberation in
making judgments, his care and rigor in the process, but always ac-
companied by an overarching civility. When I discovered the epigraph
above-in a tribute penned by Wade himselfL.-it reflected the impres-
sion I had formed of this great man. He loved trouthe, honour, fre-
don, and curteisie. Worthy and wys, yet meeke as a mayde seem to
capture exactly the right image. Dean John Wade was a verray, par-
fit gentil knyght.
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. The Author is grateful for the research assis-
tance of Michael Glackin.
1. John W. Wade, EEC, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 21 (1968).
609
VANDERBILT LAW REWEW
Dean Wade is best known for his contributions to tort law, but
his contributions in other fields should not go unmentioned. His text
on restitution and scholarship in that area are still widely read and
influential. His scholarly work included oil and gas law, statutory
interpretation, consumer protection, domestic relations, and military
law.
But I and most others know John Wade for his work in tort
law. He touched many facets of tort law during his long career. His
casebook is the leading one on torts, has reached an unprecedented
ninth edition,2 and has introduced nearly one million law students to
the intrigue, dilemmas, human tragedy, stimulation, and values of
tort law. He served on the advisory committee for portions of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and as co-reporter for the final por-
tions, published in 1977 and 1979.3 Wade was the author of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act,4 a model statute that contains so
much wisdom that it borders on criminal that more states have not
adopted it as their own. I am proud that my home state, Iowa, is one
of two states that had the good sense to employ the act as the basis
for its comparative fault statute.
Having been provided the freedom to choose one aspect of
Dean Wade's work on which to focus by the editors of this Review, I
selected the issue of design defect standards in products liability.
There were two reasons for this choice. First, Wade's contribution in
this area were well ahead of his time; in 1973, he addressed this mat-
ter in an article that predicted, with uncanny accuracy, the future
course of design defect law.5 Second, the question of appropriate
standards for design defect cases is currently being addressed by the
American Law Institute ("ALr') in the drafting of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability.6 The influence of Wade's work
2. John W. Wade, Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, and David F. Partlett, Prosser,
Wade and Schwartz's Cases and Materials on Torts (Foundation, 9th ed. 1994).
3. 3 Restatement (Second) of the Law: Torts (1977) and 4 Restatement (Second) of the
Law: Torts (1979).
4. Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 42 (West Supp. 1994).
5. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825
(1973).
6. The American Law Institute has begun preparing the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
The first piece of the third Restatement, begun in 1992, is the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability ("the Products Liability Restatement"). The most recent version of the
Products Liability Restatement, as this essay was written, is Tentative Draft No. 2, which bears
a date of March 13, 1995. A substantial body of that draft likely will obtain final approval by
the membership of the ALI in May, 1995.
The Products Liability Restatement has already been the subject of extensive commentary.
See generally A Symposium on the ALI's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1043 (1994); Symposium, The Revision of Section 402A of the
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continues today in the effort to restate the past thirty years of prod-
ucts liability decisions.
The genesis for strict products liability, Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts was published in 1965. Section 402A
employed the now-familiar "defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous" language to identify the circumstances in which sellers would be
held strictly liable. Of course, "strict liability" was something of a
misnomer. Liability was not to be imposed for all harm caused by a
product-only for harm that was the result of a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous7
Section 402A overlooked any differentiation among the various
types of defects that might occur in a product.8 The blackletter lan-
guage provided no elaboration on what a "defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous" might mean. But in comments, the contracts
heritage of Section 402A provided some explication: a product was
defective when its condition was one "not contemplated by the ulti-
mate consumer" and posed unreasonable dangers9 Not quite equiva-
lently, another comment stated that a product was defective when
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it." 10  Thus, protecting
"expectations," very much the concern of contract law, was the guid-
ance offered by Section 402A for those courts that were convinced that
the day had come to hold product sellers to a higher standard and
that looked to the Restatement for the appropriate standards to ap-
ply.
While most of the courts and commentators were attempting to
understand and unravel the vagaries of this new world of liability,
Dean Wade published an article about strict liability that was a tour
de force."' Before courts appreciated the need to distinguish among
different kinds of defects, Wade carefully elaborated the three types of
defects that might make a product unreasonably dangerous: manu-
facturing defects, design defects, and warnings defects. In the same
Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for Reform of Products Liability Law?, 10 Touro L. Rev.
1(1993).
7. For a cogent explanation of what true strict liability might entail, see Wade, 44 Miss.
L. J. at 828 (cited in note 5).
8. See generally George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10
Cardozo L. Rev. 2301 (1989) (arguing that the drafters of Section 402A were considering only
manufacturing defects, not warning or design defects).
9. Restatement (Second) § 402A, comment g.
10. Id., comment i.
11. See generally Wade, 44 Miss. L. J. 825 (cited in note 5).
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article, Wade identified and explained a host of products liability
issues with which the courts nevertheless spent the next several
decades attempting to come to grips. The number of controversial
products liability issues and Wade's prescience in addressing them
can be fully appreciated only by one familiar with the development of
strict products liability law over the past twenty years who examines
Wade's work in this Article.
Over twenty-six pithy pages, Wade argued that the jury should
be provided with guidance about the meaning of the phrase "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous," 12 that the phrase was an infelici-
tous one to serve as the standard for strict liability;5 that the best
reason for employing strict liability was the difficulty of proving neg-
ligence;14 that while tort liability for damages could be a powerful
deterrent force for enterprises, the consequences of personal injury,
not whether the tort system will compensate them for their damages,
provides incentives for most individuals to exercise care; 5 that the
consumer expectations test was inappropriate for determining design
defects because consumers in many design situations lack any real or
informed expectation;6 that true strict liability should be applied to
manufacturing defects; 7 and, as a corollary, that a negligence stan-
dard should govern design and warnings defects; 3 that the appropri-
ate relationship between a manufacturer's warning and design obliga-
tions required that certain risks be obviated by design changes even if
a warning was provided; 9 that misuse primarily implicates the ques-
tion of whether the product is defective;20 that bystanders should be
afforded the same protection that Section 402A offers users or con-
sumers;21 that crashworthiness is merely a stylized form of design
defect litigation and that automobile accidents are sufficiently fore-
seeable that manufacturers should have such a design obligation;22
12. Id. at 832, 839.
13. Id. at 832-33.
14. Id. at 826.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 829. Twenty-one years later, the California Supreme Court, which deserves
much of the credit for the development of strict products liability, reached a similar conclusion.
See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 882 P.2d 298, 308-09 (1994).
17. Wade, 44 Miss. L. J. at 837.
18. Id. at 841-42.
19. Id. at 842. See Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (1978)
(adopting a standard equivalent to that advocated by Wade). Uloth is the case adopted in a
number of products liability textbooks to address the question of the intersection between
warning and design obligations.
20. Wade, 44 Miss. L. J. at 846.
21. Id. at 835.
22. Id. at 847-48.
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and that whether an injured claimant sues in negligence or strict
liability, comparative fault concepts should govern affirmative de-
fenses based on the claimant's conduct.23
For those familiar with the contemporary products liability
scene and the current version of the Products Liability Restatement,
these ideas will not be earth shattering. Virtually every one of Dean
Wade's prescriptions can be found in the currently proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. However, in 1973,
when Wade first surfaced these ideas, they were apostasy, rejecting
central tenets of the strict liability canon crafted by Section 402A,
with the collaboration of the California Supreme Court.
Most significantly, both in terms of the controversy it has gen-
erated and what I would like to focus on in the remainder of this
essay, is the use of risk-benefit analysis as the appropriate standard
for determining design defect claims. Well before its time, while
courts were still struggling to understand what strict liability meant
in the design defect context, John Wade urged rejection of the con-
sumer expectations test and adoption of a risk-benefit test by which to
judge design claims: "Another way of saying this is to ask whether
the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condition of the
product was outweighed by the social utility attained by putting it out
in this fashion."2 4 As Wade recognized, he was advocating a return to
the now-familiar calculus of risk first adumbrated by Learned Hand
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,25 and reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 6 In Carroll Towing, Judge Hand
adopted the formula of PL>B to express when an actor should be
found negligent. Thus, a person is negligent when the magnitude of
the foreseeable danger (L) discounted by the probability (P) that it
will occur is greater than the burden (B) of taking precaution to pre-
vent the harm from occurring.27 Such a standard requires a balancing
of risks against benefits; when the risks of a given design outweigh its
benefits, the design is unreasonable. Wade provided a list of seven
factors to be employed in conducting the balancing he advocated. 28
23. Id. at 850-51.
24. Id. at 835.
25. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
26. Restatement (Second) § 291. See also Restatement of Torts § 291 (1934).
27. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
28. Those factors are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product---its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
1995] 613
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Wade's advocacy of a risk-benefit standard has had a powerful
impact on design defect law over the past twenty years. 29 The leading
common law decisions adopting a risk-benefit analysis cite Wade's
article and quote his list of seven factors.30 Today, it appears that risk
benefit has largely won the design defect day; Professors Henderson
and Twerski, the reporters for the Products Liability Restatement,
have exhaustively catalogued the law of each state and concluded that
the consumer expectations standard contained in the comments to
Section 402A survives as the governing rule in only a small minority
of jurisdictions.31 The current version of the Restatement of Products
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the prod-
uct.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, 44 Miss. L. J. at 837-38 (cited in note 5) (footnote omitted). See also John W. Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. U. L. Rev. 5, 17 (1965) (providing a similar list of
factors to be employed in a risk-benefit balancing).
29. The article in which Wade advocated a risk-benefit standard by which to judge design
defects has been described by others as " '[tihe single most influential piece of guiding scholar-
ship' in the period when product defect was being defined and expanded." Louis R. Frumer and
Melvin I. Friedman, Products Liability § 1.02 at 1-38 n.26 (Matthew Bender, 1994) (quoting, in
part, David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681,
682 (1980)). See also W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39
Am. U. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1990) (stating that '"Wade's seven factors have played.., a dominant
role in the liability literature").
30. See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516, 519 (1985)
(reproduced in James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability: Problems
and Process 497 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1992)); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Company, 269 Ore.
485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 n.13 (1974) (reproduced in David A. Fischer and William Powers, Jr.,
Products Liability: Cases and Materials 177 (2d ed. 1994) and W. Page Keeton, et al., Products
Liability and Safety: Cases and Materials 210 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1989) (reproducing Wade's
seven factors at 215)); Jerry J. Phillips, et al., Products Liability: Cases, Materials, Problems
174 (Michie, 1994); Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816, 826-
27 (1978); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1974); Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Riski Utility,
48 Ohio St. L. J. 469, 475 n.19 (1987) (claiming that "[tihe influence of [the Wade factors] have
[sic] been enormous"); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176, 183-84 & n.18
(1984) (citing to Wade's article and his risk-utility test for design defects); O Brien v. Muskin
Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 304-05 (1983); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
573 P.2d 443, 454 (1978); Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: Cases and Materials 97-98
(Foundation, 1980) (quoting Wade's list of seven factors).
31. Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 2, § 2,
Reporters' Note, comment c, at 51-53 (March 13, 1995) ("Tentative Draft No. 2"). The Supreme
Court of California in Soule, 882 P.2d at 308-10, delivered one of the final nails in the consumer
614
1995] RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 615
Liability adopts a risk-benefit standard for determining design de-
fects.3 2
Having traced the triumph of risk benefit (and negligence) over
consumer expectations for design defect litigation, what is there left
to say? Quite a bit, I think. The schism in risk-benefit analysis be-
tween, first, the rigorous, precise, green-eyeshade version provided by
welfare economics and, second, the softer, reasonableness version
deserves some explication, if for no other reason than to reduce confu-
sion among those confronting the divide. Both of these competing
visions of risk-benefit analysis can be found in existing products li-
ability jurisprudence, often without appreciation of the conflict.3
The hard-edged, implicit wealth-maximizing, version of risk-
benefit analysis is the contribution of economic theory and has found
its way into the legal landscape through the law and economics
movement. Economists begin with the proposition that scarcity is a
universal condition and that the production of all goods (including
such intangibles as safety) involves a trade-off among different
goods.3 Safety (in the form of fewer or less serious accidents) can be
obtained, but only by foregoing some other goods (or benefits) such as
faster cars or more productive punch presses. In 1972, Richard
Posner explained this economic version of risk-benefit analysis as
expectations coffin. The court, which had earlier adopted an alternative risk-benefit or
consumer expectations test for design defect claims, observed that the consumer expectations
test should be invoked only in those situations in which their ordinary experience would provide
them with an understanding of the minimum degree of safety the product should provide. In
other instances in which the product or context were too complex, only a risk-benefit test should
be employed to determine if the product is designed defectively.
32. Tentative Draft No. 2 § 2(b).
33. Another major issue the risk-benefit standard implicates is the time at which risks
should be evaluated: when the product is manufactured or at the time of trial. Dean Wade was
at the forefront of that matter, which appears pretty well resolved on the contemporary
products liability scene, in the fashion Dean Wade ultimately suggested. See John W. Wade, On
the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
734, 761-64 (1983) (describing Dean Wade's position). I put aside that question and its resolu-
tion; risk-benefit analysis nevertheless confronts the conflict and difficulties discussed in the
remainder of this essay.
34. See, for example, Armen Alchien and William R. Allen, Exchange & Production:
Competition, Coordination, & Control 2-4 (Wadsworth, 3d ed. 1983). The more generalized
version of risk-benefit analysis is cost-benefit analysis, which balances all costs, not merely
injuries and hazards, against benefits. See E. J. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Informal
Introduction 22-24 (Unwin Hyman, 4th ed. 1988). Cost-benefit analysis is frequently employed
to evaluate governmental programs or regulations and does not account for distributional effects
and their fairness. Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations,
Considerations of Health Benefit-Cost Analysis for Activities Involving Ionizing Radiation
Exposure and Alternatives 68-70 (E.PJL, 1977). For purposes of this essay, we can limit our
concerns to risk-benefit analysis in the private context of designing a product that satisfies tort
law standards.
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applied to liability for accidental injury, employing Learned Hand's
algebraic formulation of negligence:
Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability
of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated from
incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident. The cost of prevention is
what Hand meant by the burden of taking precautions against the accident. It
may be the cost of installing safety equipment.., or eliminating the activity.
If the cost of safety measures or of curtailment-whichever cost is
lower-exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that
cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident preven-
tion.35
We should be clear: safety is a commodity that can be pur-
chased, but only at a cost. Any marginal safety (i.e., reduction of inju-
ries) that might be obtained must be compared to the marginal costs
of obtaining it. When those costs are greater, we should forego the
additional safety and accept instead the accident toll.36 Of course,
"cost" is not limited to dollars, but includes all activities or resources
that are scarce, including, for example, time, leisure, and esthetics.
Translating this analytical framework to design defect law
requires recognition of a point Professor Gary Schwartz brought home
forcefully. We cannot meaningfully apply a risk-benefit test to a de-
sign without having an alternative design by which to make the com-
parison and conduct the analysis.3 7 The alternative design must be on
balance a safer one that provides greater safety (less risk) than the
challenged, existing design. At the same time, we must compare the
costs of the two designs, to compare the additional costs of the alter-
native design with the additional safety it provides (or equivalently,
the risk of the existing design compared to its benefits). We simply
35. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29,32 (1972).
36. This version of risk-benefit analysis does not necessarily speak to the appropriate
liability standard, as strict liability may also produce the same incentives for safety, albeit with
different distributional effects. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
§ 6.5 at 175-80 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992).
Implicit in the adoption of a risk-benefit test, however, is the norm of wealth maximization,
although there are many reasons why such a test is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for such an outcome. As many readers are aware, wealth maximization (or economic efficiency)
as a legal norm (especially as a sole norm) is a controversial issue. See generally, for example,
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980).
37. " he heart of the problem is this: one simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-
benefit defect in a product design until and unless one has identified some design alternative
(including any design omission) that can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit analysis." Gary T.
Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 435, 468 (1979).
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cannot identify and make a comparison of the risks of the existing
design and its benefits without an alternative design. 38
But what currency shall we (or the jury) use to measure and
compare the intangibles that might be implicated in a design choice?
To be sure, some aspects may have a market value: the price for an
airbag or a radon detector. But how shall we value an esthetically
pleasing design that if we eschewed would avoid an element of risk?
How shall we value the unpleasantness of the piercing screech of a
back-up warning device on earth-moving equipment? How much is a
broken arm, shattered brain, or a life worth? 9 The market in these
items is quite thin, even nonexistent for some,40 which poses an
incommensurability difficulty-the need to make comparisons
between items that do not align on any common scale or measure.41
Indeed, the problem is more serious than that: the stark balancing of
lives and limbs with money strikes many as jarring, inappropriate,
even absurd.42
38. The one exception to this statement is to consider the benefits and costs of the entire
product. This entails a comparison of the state of the world with and without the product. In
essence, an absence of the product becomes the alternative design. For the most part, courts
have eschewed permittingjuries to make that type of risk-benefit comparison for products that
are sold legally. See, for example, Tentative Draft No. 2 § 2, Reporter's Note, comment c, at 94-
97 (cited in note 31).
39. A distinct problem is obtaining the relevant data about the frequency and seriousness
of injury due to the challenged design. The practical difficulties that stand in the way of such an
empirical inquiry led Learned Hand to later characterize his PL>B formula for negligence as
"illusory." Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (1st Cir. 1949).
40. Ideally, in conducting an economic risk-benefit analysis, the value of avoiding risks of
death or injury would be measured by what consumers were willing to pay for such additional
safety. See note 42.
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
779, 796 (1994) (stating that "[ilncommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how
these goods are best characterized" (emphasis omitted)); Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its
Reform 149 (Harvard U., 1982) (noting that "monetization as an effort to fund commensurability
faces intractable difficulties").
42. See text accompanying notes 81-88. Despite public reaction to valuing life, economists
have employed a variety of methods to address this matter, and regulators frequently employ
dollar values for premature death and other injuries. Professor Viscusi reports that employees
in the United States are paid anT additional $500 per year for assuming a risk of 1/10,000 of
premature death during that year, from which economists would extrapolate linearly to a value
of $5 million for a premature death. W. Nip Viscusi, et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical
Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall
L. Rev. 1437, 1450-52 (1994). For a survey of the methodology and literature in the value-of-life
field, see W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk ch. 4
(Oxford U., 1992) (finding value of life in the range of $3 million to $7 million, id. at 73); Stephen
E. Rhoads, ed., Valuing Life: Public Policy Dilemmas (Westview, 1980); Breyer, Regulation at
150-51.
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By comparison, many, including Dean Wade, employed risk-
benefit balancing in a considerably looser, multi-factorial, reasonable-
ness inquiry that departs significantly from the account-ledger com-
parison of costs in the economic version.43 Outside the products
liability context, this was in part due to the difficulty of applying a
risk-benefit standard to momentary individual inadvertence. Many
accidents due to individuals' acts occur, as Professor William Rodgers
explains, "not as a result of the conscious implementation of a calcu-
lus of costs and benefits, but because of the boredom, fatigue, anger or
other influences that regularly encroach upon human behavior.
''44
Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which adopts a risk-benefit
standard for determining negligence, carefully qualifies the benefits
to be considered as those "that the law regards as the utility 45 of the
defendant's activity, which includes a policy judgment about the social
benefits of the activity. We should not forget that the care taken by a
reasonably prudent person is the prime standard for negligence ex-
pressed in the Restatement46 and by most courts.47
A very good, but by no means isolated, example of this laxer
version of risk-benefit analysis for design defects is reflected in
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Company.48 The plaintiff had been
injured when he fell while using a power mower on a hill. During the
fall, his foot was caught in the blade of the mower. He alleged that
the mower was designed defectively because it lacked a guard on the
rear of the mower housing. The court, after citing Dean Wade's
article and factors, articulated the considerations that bore on
defectiveness: the social utility of the product, the presence or
absence of warnings, the risk of danger, how significant the impact
would be on product effectiveness and product cost of employing risk
reducing measures, and the obviousness of any dangers.49 At the
43. For an economist's critique of Wade's seven factors, see Viscusi, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. at
580-91 (cited in note 29).
44. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered The Role of Rationality in Tort
Theory, "54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1980).
45. Restatement (Second) § 291. See also id. § 291, comment d; id. § 292(a).
46. Restatement (Second) §§ 282-283.
47. By contrast with the economic version of risk-benefit analysis, one commentator has
observed: 'Tort Law is law with a human face...." Peter H. Schuck, Introduction. The Context
of the Controversy, in Peter H. Schuck, ed., Tort Law and the Public Interest 17, 21 (W.W.
Norton, 1991).
48. 395 N-2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
49. Id. at 846-48. Another, more recent, example is Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga.
732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994), in which the court adopted a risk-benefit standard for design defects.
The court included such "diverse matters" as "tactical market decisions, ... the idiosyncrasies of
individual corporate management styles, and federal and other regulatory restrictions" as
relevant to "the reasonableness of a manufacturer's decision-making process." Id. at 675. Those
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same time, the court rejected risk-spreading as a factor to be
employed, thereby diverging from Dean Wade and his seventh
factor.50
How might these factors be employed in the more rigorous,
economic version of risk-benefit analysis? Which ones would be rele-
vant and which irrelevant if we take the economists and their version
of risk-benefit analysis seriously?
First, let us acknowledge the considerations that are directly
relevant. Surely the risk of danger is one item. But, we must be care-
ful. The additional accidents, their severity and any greater severity
of accidents that would occur in any event due to the absence of a rear
guard is the "risk of danger" that comprises one side of the Hand
formula-PL.5' Any diminution in product effectiveness that might
result from employing the rear guard comprises a portion of the bur-
den of precaution, or to put it another way, the benefit of the existing
design. Thus, if the rear guard increased the circumference of the
mower, making it less nimble and reducing its ability to mow in tight
quarters, we would balance that against the risks that could be
avoided. Similarly, any additional cost to produce and add a rear
guard constitutes an additional aspect of the burden of precaution.52
What of the utility of the product? Irrelevant to the analysis.
What we are interested in is the marginal utility of the existing de-
sign, not the overall societal benefits of the product. To put the point
another way, imagine that we have identified a one hundred percent
effective vaccine for AIDS. Suppose the vaccine causes a mild auto-
immune reaction-a rash that lasts for a week-in one out of a mil-
lion persons who take the vaccine. The side effect can be eliminated
by changing one of the inert ingredients with which the vaccine is
coated to another inert ingredient, no more expensive and equally
adept at serving its purpose. The vaccine is defectively designed
despite its enormous social utility. Risk-benefit analysis operates at
the margin-the utility of the existing design compared to the alter-
native-not at the level of the entire product.
factors would plainly play no role in an economic risk-benefit analysis, as the discussion in the
text demonstrates.
50. Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d at 845-46. See note 28 (listing the seven
factors).
51. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
52. A careful economist would insist that we discount all aspects of these risks and bene-
fits incurred at different times to their present values. See Viscusi, 39 Am. L. Rev. at 594-95
(cited in note 29).
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Suppose the alternative design would increase the price of the
product by fifty percent? One hundred percent? A thousand percent?
Similarly irrelevant. The comparison is not with the existing cost of
the product, but with the safety benefits that can be obtained. That
is, if a moderately priced product entails substantial risks of personal
injury, we should be willing to spend up to the amount of those risks
to avoid them, and not be concerned by the relationship between the
costs of safety features and the other costs of producing the product.
Safety is a separate component of the cost of a product and the rele-
vant comparison is the risk to be avoided, not its relationship to the
other costs.
The analysis becomes a little more complicated with the re-
maining two factors cited by the Thibault court: the obviousness of
the danger and any warnings that were provided. Neither directly
bears on the magnitude of harm, the probability of an accident, or the
burden of precaution. Yet, when a danger has been warned about
(along with, where appropriate, an explanation about how and why to
avoid the danger) or when the danger is sufficiently obvious that a
warning would add little to a user's knowledge of the risks and how to
avoid them, the consumer is in a position to minimize the possibility
of injury with her own risk-reducing behavior. Thus, if a lawn chair is
manufactured with a sharp aluminum edge underneath the armrest,
a warning about the existence of that danger may substantially
reduce the risk that it poses.53 Warnings and obviousness thus can be
seen for their appropriate role in an economic risk-benefit analysis;
they are not of concern in and of themselves, but because of their
impact on the parameters of concern: the probability of an accident
and its severity. These might be characterized as "second tier"
concerns, important because of their impact on the first tier matters
of risk and cost.
Let us contrast Thibault and its reasonableness version of
risk-benefit analysis with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.54 Brought
on behalf of a cigarette victim, the case alleged that cigarettes were a
defective product. Thus, the alternative design was not some change
in how cigarettes were made, but no cigarettes. Plaintiffs claim was
that the overall adverse health effects of cigarettes outweighed any
53. See Matthews v. Lawnlite Company, 88 S.2d 299 (Fla. 1956). Of course, despite the
warning, a lawn chair with a sharp edge that severed the finger of a user, as the chair in
Matthews did, id. at 300, might still be defective, given the ease with which an alternative
design could be employed to obviate the danger.
54. 644 F. Supp. 283 (D. N.J. 1986).
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social benefits that they provided. 55 One defendant asserted that the
benefits of cigarettes included the jobs it provided to those employed
in the production, marketing, and sales of cigarettes, the favorable
contribution to the country's trade balance through their export, and
the taxes paid by the industry to all levels of government in this coun-
try.5 Plaintiff, contending that those contributions were irrelevant to
a risk-benefit analysis of cigarettes, moved in limine to exclude any
evidence about those benefits. 57
Surely the defendant had a point. Balance of trade, unem-
ployment, and the coffers of government are important considerations
that might sway a fact finder making a comparative judgment about
the world with and without cigarettes. Not surprisingly, the defen-
dant found support in Dean Wade's risk-benefit test and the first of
his factors, the benefit of the product to society.58
Rejecting this reasonableness assessment of the costs and
benefits of cigarettes, the court held that the defendant could not
introduce evidence about employment, exports, or taxes.59 Economists
serious about risk-benefit analysis would have applauded the court's
decision.6O The labor that the industry employs to produce and sell its
goods is not an economic "benefit" of cigarettes, rather it reflects a
cost of production. Those human resources expended in the produc-
tion of cigarettes, like the farmland devoted to growing tobacco, could
be employed for other productive purposes. Of course, in a slack
economy, there may be temporary dislocation until tobacco industry
employees find alternative employment, but that only addresses the
true opportunity cost of the employees' labors; it does not transform
them from a cost to a benefit.6 1 To dramatize the point, cigarettes also
provide employment for the physicians who treat smoking victims and
55. Id. at 285.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 284-86.
58. Id. at 288 & n.2. Indeed, the defendant might also have found succor in other areas of
tort law. For example, the importance of an activity to the community and its economy is
explicitly considered in determining whether the activity is abnormally dangerous and, there-
fore, subject to strict liability. Restatement (Second) § 520(f), comment k. Dean Wade joined
Dean Prosser as a reporter for this portion of the Torts Restatement.
59. Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 290.
60. For an excellent analysis, see Mary Griffin, Note, The Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc- Process Concerns in Determining Whether Cigarettes Are a Defectively
Designed Product, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 606, 616-19 (1988). Portions of this essay draw on the
discussion in Griffin's article.
61. See Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis at 67-69 (cited in note 34).
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the morticians who bury them, yet we would not count that as a
"benefit" of the cigarette industry.6 2
Payment of taxes or charitable contributions by the tobacco
industry are neither costs nor benefits of cigarettes. Rather these are
merely transfer payments from one entity to another that neither
consume resources nor produce them, but instead have distributional
consequences and provide consumption decisions to others.63 While as
a society we might believe that contributions to a shelter that pro-
vides housing for homeless persons are a preferable expenditure to an
increase in the compensation for the chief executive officer of a to-
bacco company, economists, with their unwillingness to make inter-
personal comparisons of utility, eschew such judgments.64 Similarly,
any benefits to the country's foreign trade balance are already re-
flected in the price paid by those to whom cigarettes are exported.
Including foreign trade effects results in a form of "double-counting"
the benefits of cigarettes.65
The true "benefit" of cigarettes in this welfare economics ver-
sion of risk-benefit analysis is the pleasure or utility that it provides
to smokers. This enjoyment is reflected in the price that consumers
pay plus the additional amounts that they would be willing to pay if
cigarettes were priced higher.6 That is precisely what Judge Sarokin
permitted the defendant to introduce in the Cipollone case. Cipollone
thus stands in sharp contrast to the Thibault approach.
In the face of this schizophrenia, where does the current draft
of the Restatement of Products Liability stand? It could, after all,
make a contribution to resolving this significant breach in products
liability law. The answer, I think, is that the Restatement stands
right about in the middle, unwilling to make an explicit choice be-
tween the two.
62. See Keeton, et al., Products Liability at 886 (cited in note 30).
63. See Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis at 74 (cited in note 34). For an economist-
commentator who nevertheless accepted the arguments of the tobacco industry, see Viscusi, 39
Am. L. Rev. at 596 & n.112 (cited in note 29).
Wade's seventh factor, the ability of the manufacturer to spread the loss by purchasing
insurance or by increasing the price of the products, similarly involves a transfer payment that
has distributional consequences but no relevance to a strict risk-benefit analysis.
64. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46
Vand. L. Rev. 305 (1993).
65. Lyn Squire and Herman G. van der Tak, Economic Analysis of Projects 24-25 (Johns
Hopkins U., 1975). Moreover, if we limit benefits to those enjoyed only by United States resi-
dents, we should exclude any consumer surplus that foreign purchaser of cigarettes obtain.
Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis at 74 (cited in note 34).
66. The latter aspect is known as consumer surplus. See Alchien and Allen, Exchange &
Production at 17-18 (cited in note 34); Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis at 22-24.
622 [Vol. 48:609
RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The current version of the Restatement of Products Liability
requires that a plaintiff alleging a design defect introduce evidence of
a 'reasonable alternative design."67 By requiring an alternative de-
sign, the Restatement recognizes that the economic version of risk-
benefit analysis cannot be undertaken without a basis for comparison.
By using "reasonable" to modify "alternative design," and explicitly
invoking the reasonable person standard of the Restatement
(Second),68 the Products Liability Restatement takes a significant step
toward the softer version.
Comment d to Section 2 of the Restatement elaborates on those
factors to be considered in the risk-benefit assessment. These factors
include items that were identified previously as directly relevant to
the economic version of risk-benefit analysis: the magnitude of fore-
seeable risks; the additional cost of the alternative design; and the
impact of the alternative design on the product's function, longevity,
maintenance, and esthetics. The same comment cautions that it is
inappropriate to consider the impact on corporate earnings or em-
ployment, thereby endorsing the Cipollone court's adherence to the
economic version of risk-benefit analysis. Moreover, the Reporters'
Note identifies a careful comparison of the added safety of the alter-
native design with the adverse consequences of adopting it.69
Significantly, the current version of the Products Liability
Restatement omits a sentence contained in an earlier draft: 'The
monetary cost of the alternative design may put it outside of the price
range of a significant portion of the market."7 The omission of that
consideration, only applicable in the reasonableness version of risk-
benefit, similarly signals an adherence to the economic approach.
67. Tentative Draft No. 2 § 2(b) & comments c, at 19, e, at 24 (cited in note 31).
68. Id. § 2, comment c, at 19 provides:
Assessment of a product design requires a comparison between an alternative design
and the product design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person. That standard is also used in administering the traditional
reasonableness standard in negligence. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 283,
Comment c. The policy reasons that support use of a reasonable person perspective in
connection with the general negligence standard also support its use in the products
liability context.
69. Id. § 2, Reporters' Note, comment e(1), at 99 (stating that "[t]he monetary cost of the
alternative design may exceed the safety benefits to be derived from it. Furthermore, an
alternative design may impose significant nonmonetary costs on product users and consumers.
It may deprive a product of important features which make it desirable and attractive to many
users and consumers").
70. Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 1 § 2,
Reporters' Note, comment d(2), at 62 (April 12, 1994) ("Tentative Draft No. 1").
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The mixed message, however, continues. A second tier con-
cern, warnings and instructions, is included without differentiation in
the list of factors. 71 The impact of the alternative design on the prod-
uct's marketability, which sounds suspiciously like the increase in the
price of the product, and its impact on demand is included in the fac-
tors to be considered. 72 Consumer expectations are also included as a
relevant consideration for evaluating the design. 3 We are instructed
that "although consumer expectations are not determinative of
whether a product is defectively designed, they constitute an
important factor in determining the necessity for, or the adequacy of,
a proposed alternative design." 4 Consumer expectations are not, like
the frequency of injury, directly relevant to an economic risk-benefit
analysis. They may be a worthy norm, as Professor Shapo argues, 75 or
deserve consideration in an assessment of the reasonableness of a
design, but they are not a first tier concern. The way in which
consumer expectations may be relevant to a risk-benefit test is, like
the obvious aspect of dangers, through their impact on the frequency
and severity of injury and, therefore, constitute a relevant second tier
concern, but that point is only made once and somewhat obscurely in
the commentary to the Products Liability Restatement.76
Aside from ambiguous signals, the Products Liability
Restatement fails to address the most difficult, perhaps intractable,
problem posed by the economic version of risk-benefit analysis. That
conundrum, identified earlier, is making comparisons between in-
commensurables. Specifically, risk-benefit analysis entails comparing
71. Tentative Draft No. 2 § 2, comment e, at 24 (cited in note 31).
72. Alternatively, this item might be understood to adopt a consumer-willingness-to-pay
standard to value items such as esthetics, reduced functionality of the alternative design, and
similar benefits of the existing design. This approach would be consistent with an economic
risk-benefit test, but would be quite unfamiliar to most courts that leave valuation matters to
the jury rather than instructing it to ascertain consumers' willingness to pay.
73. Tentative Draft No. 2 § 2, comment e, at 24 (cited in note 31).
74. Id. § 2, comment f, at 29.
75. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement
Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 665-68 (1995).
76. Commentary in the proposed Restatement provides that "consumer expectations about
product performance and the dangers attendant to product use affect how risks are perceived
and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risk of harm, both of which are factors in [risk-
utility balancing.]" Tentative Draft No. 2 § 2(b), comment f, at 29 (cited in note 31). So far, so
good in terms of consistency with the economic version. The comment continues: "Such
expectations are often influenced by how products are portrayed and marketed and can have a
significant impact on consumer behavior. Furthermore, products liability law derives in part
from the law of warranty where consumer expectations have special significance." Id. The way
in which consumer expectations are formed, even if a result of misrepresentations by the
manufacturer, would not bear on a strict risk-benefit analysis, and the second quoted sentence
implies there is something independently relevant to consumer expectations, aside from their
effect on the frequency and severity of accidents, also inconsistent with the strict version.
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injuries and death, on the one hand, and the costs-often in dol-
lars-of additional safety features on the other.
The difficulty implicated for design defect litigation was
prominently illuminated in the Ford Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Company.77 The case involved a rear-end collision of a Ford
Pinto, in which a thirteen year old passenger suffered devastating
burns when the Pinto's gas tank ruptured and the leaking gasoline
caught fire.78 The location of the gas tank, behind the rear axle, its
construction, and the strength of the rear structure of the Pinto were
alleged to constitute design defects that resulted in the fire.79 The
question of a risk-benefit analysis of the gas tank and rear structure
design played a central role in the case, in the jury's award of $125
million in punitive damages against Ford,8o and in the public outrage
that the case engendered.
During discovery, plaintiffs obtained a document that one
prominent trial lawyer has described as "possibly the most remark-
able document ever produced in an American lawsuit."' l The docu-
ment, prepared for submission to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), contained a risk-benefit analysis of pro-
posed fuel tank safety regulations designed to reduce injury and death
due to fires in automobile accidents.82 The risk-benefit analysis con-
cluded that 180 burn deaths could be avoided with a design change
and assigned a value of $200,000 for each life saved. Compared with
these deaths was a cost of $11 per car for 12.5 million vehicles that
amounted to $137 million83 Even with burn injuries and property
77. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). Professor Gary Schwartz, in a careful
and meticulously researched article, has provided a wealth of information about the Grimshaw
case and the details of the Ford Pinto design, from which I have borrowed in the account that
follows. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 1013
(1991). Schwartz concludes that the outcome in the Grimshaw case "raises serious questions
about the operational viability of the risk-benefit standard itself." Id. at 1067.
78. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
79. Id. at 359-62.
80. See Roy J. Harris Jr., Why the Pinto Jury Felt Ford Deserved $125 Million Penalty,
Wall St. J. 1, 1 (Feb. 14, 1978) (reporting that Ford knew of risks of gas tanks leaking in crashes
and balanced those risks against the $20.9 million it could save if improvements were delayed
for 2 years).
81. Stuart M. Speiser, Lawsuit 357 (Horizon, 1980).
82. Professor Schwartz has explained why the popular perception of Ford's risk-benefit
memorandum is inaccurate. See Schwartz, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1020-25 (cited in note 77).
But the erroneous conception need not detain us; indeed it seems likely that the misperceptions
were facilitated by the issue of concern, the strength of the lay public reaction to the memoran-
dum.
83. Speiser, Lawsuit at 357 (cited in note 81).
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damage added to the deaths caused by the existing design, the costs of
changing the fuel tank design to conform with the NHTSA standard
exceeded the value of the risk by almost $90 million.84
Although the report was not introduced at trial, it became the
subject of a public outcry. On a 60 Minutes program devoted to the
Ford Pinto, Mike Wallace grilled a Ford vice-president about the
report: "'I find it difficult to believe that top management of the Ford
Motor Company is going to sit there and say, "Oh, we'll buy 2,000
deaths, 10,000 injuries, because we want to make some money or we
want to bring in a cheaper car."' ,"85 An article in Mother Jones, enti-
tled Pinto Madness, excoriated the Pinto, to a large extent because
Ford was trading lives against the costs of a safety improvement.
Professor Gary Schwartz, after surveying the reaction to
Grimshaw, concludes: "What seems obvious enough is that there
exists a basic belief held by many (indeed most) of the public that it is
wrong for a corporation to make decisions that sacrifice the lives of its
customers in order to reduce the corporation's costs, to increase its
profits. ' 7  Or even, he might have added, to produce a lower-cost
product. Public attitudes about environmental choices reflect this
same dynamic: Those who insist that pollution cannot be traded for
other values or that it should be eliminated without regard to the
expense involved demonstrate the aversion to risk-benefit analysis
involving incommensurables such as environmental cleanliness and
dollars. Similarly, some individuals refuse to negotiate over the pay-
ment they would accept in exchange for an increase in pollution, often
evoking outrage at this form of "bribery.' 8
With this attitude widespread among the public who make up
juries, how can trial lawyers defend a design case by pointing to a
risk-benefit analysis performed by the manufacturer? The short an-
swer is that they can't and don't. Rather, lawyers will argue that the
alternative design would compromise the product's function or create
84. The relevant portion of the document is reproduced in Keeton, et al., Products
Liability at 841 (cited in note 30).
85. Id. at 841 (quoting Is Your Car Safe, 60 Minutes, vol. 10, no. 40, at 7 (June 11, 1978)).
86. Schwartz, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1017, 1035 (cited in note 77).
87. Id. at 1035. Schwartz also identified an array of academics, from a variety of disci-
plines, including religion, sociology, criminology, and business, who have condemned Ford for its
trading of lives for dollars. Id. at 1036-37 & n.94. Professor Barbara White has demonstrated
the stark dichotomy in judicial attitudes over risk-benefit analysis in this context. See generally
Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analsysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps
or a Hand that Hides?, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 77 (1990).
88. Sunstein, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 834-36 (cited in note 41).
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different risks in the product, but not that the costs of the alternative
design outweigh the injury or death toll that might be avoided.89
The tension between widespread public beliefs and an eco-
nomic risk-benefit test may be even greater than revealed above and
pose yet additional difficulties for employment of an economic risk-
benefit test for design defect litigation. Public attitudes toward iden-
tifiable individuals whose lives are at stake are unique. They are also
quite anomalous when compared with attitudes toward risks posed to
an anonymous population ("statistical lives"). The anomaly reflects a
deep-seated intuition that prefers efforts (and expenditures) to save
specific identifiable lives at risk as compared with statistical lives
that might be saved through prevention measures. 90 The most com-
mon example of this, though it exists in a wide variety of situations, is
in the rescue efforts devoted to those trapped in a mine, compared
with our complacency about the resources devoted to mine safety that
might save lives through prevention. In the former situation, no one
asks whether the victims' lives are "worth" the cost of the rescue
efforts, while relatively modest sums by comparison are spent to
protect the lives of those who work in mines, without apparent pro-
test. No one objects that the resources devoted to rescue the trapped
miner might be better spent to prevent mine accidents and save more
lives.
The trial of a case does not present precisely the same choice
between prevention and rescue, but it is similar91 In any lawsuit,
there is no injury or death that can be avoided, but an identifiable
plaintiff has been injured or a specific person has been killed, and the
jury must confront the individuality of that person and the harm she
suffered. The strong preference for identifiable individuals exacer-
bates the difficulty of asking a jury to perform a risk-benefit balance
that already is intuitively repugnant. The presence of an identifiable
plaintiff also tends to distract from the relevant concern: balancing
risk (magnitude multiplied by probability), rather than the death or
injury involved in the case, with the entire benefits of the existing
design.92
89. Schwartz, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1038 (cited in note 77).
90. For an excellent essay identifying the paradox and addressing various arguments to
rationalize it, see Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1415 (1969).
91. See Schwartz, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1042-43 (cited in note 77).




To be sure, all design defect cases do not require balancing
dollars with lives. Often the balance only entails a comparison of
greater productivity or improved functionality with risk. Even then,
the economic version of risk-benefit analysis is conceptually confusing
and often counterintuitive. I've observed a generation of bright, moti-
vated law students struggle to understand what counts as a benefit
that gets traded for what risks. If we are going to ask juries to per-
form this analysis, we should give them all of the help-through in-
structions-that we can.
When we do face incommensurability, solutions to the disso-
nance between public and jury attitudes and the reality of economic
risk-benefit analyses are not easy to imagine. One response, which
may explain its endurance, is a retreat to the reasonableness stan-
dard, in which a variety of loosely defied factors are identified, but
without confronting the stark reality that lives are to be balanced
with dollars. That is, in essence, what courts like Thibault have
adopted. That may be the result of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, which contains its mixed message and omits even
a hint of the incommensurability problem. Another possibility might
be to provide that manufacturers who explicitly reveal to purchasers
the risk-benefit trade-offs employed in designing a product cannot be
held liable for a defective design based on the values assigned to inju-
ries and deaths that are disclosed to those who purchase the product.
At the very least, this would avoid the objection that manufacturers
are secretly making decisions to impose risks on consumers, an im-
portant factor in most individuals' assessments of the acceptability of
risk.93 It would also obviate the objection that the values assigned to
death and injuries by the manufacturer are too low. The idea re-
quires further development and consideration, but this is not the
appropriate place to begin another article. Perhaps it is misguided to
try to facilitate a jury reviewing or conducting a serious risk-benefit
analysis, and we should leave that function to the courts, only asking
juries to resolve disputes about the underlying facts required for a
risk-benefit analysis.94 Perhaps we should leave such questions to
93. See Breyer, Regulation at 151 (cited in note 41) (suggesting that individuals are less
concerned with risks that are voluntarily assumed than those imposed involuntarily).
94. Ironically, one of the most criticized products liability decisions, Azzarello v. Black
Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), contemplates precisely this division of labor be-
tween judge and jury. See 391 A.2d at 1026 (holding that the question of whether a product's
utility outweighs the danger it poses is one of law). See also Jordan v. K-Mart Corp., 417 Pa.
Super. 186, 611 A.2d 1328, 1330 (1992) (stating that the trial judge "meticulously weighed the
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regulatory agencies, which regularly employ risk-benefit analyses,
and consider those judgments dispositive in tort cases requiring risk-
benefit analyses.9 5
I'm not sure that Dean Wade would agree with all of the fore-
going. Yet I am quite certain that he would have read (or listened)
respectfully and with an open mind. He would have valued the effort
to explicate these ideas and the tensions that they identify in an area
of the law to which he devoted his considerable energy and wisdom.
He would have responded with civility, grace, and wisdom. I regret
that I will not have the benefit of his thoughtful criticism, but take a
small measure of solace that these thoughts, imperfect as they are,
stand as a memorial to a verray, parfit gentil knyght: Dean John
Wade.
relative risks and utility of the sled in question ... to determine whether liability should be
imposed").
95. See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, et al., 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1442-46 (cited in note
42) (describing the risk-benefit analysis undertaken by the FDA in the drug approval process).
But see Clayton P. Gillette and James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1027, 1031 (1990) (arguing that "[p]roposals to increase the scope of agency authority at the
expense ofjudicial scrutiny are remarkably premature").
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